Machine Learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that rely on perturbing the input data. This work proposes a novel strategy using Autoencoder Deep Neural Networks to defend a machine learning model against two gradient-based attacks: The Fast Gradient Sign attack and the Fast Gradient attack. First we use an autoencoder to denoise the test data, which is trained with both clean and corrupted data. Then, we reduce the dimension of the denoised data using the hidden layer representation of another autoencoder. We perform this experiment for multiple values of the bound of adversarial perturbations, and consider different numbers of reduced dimensions. When the test data is preprocessed using this cascaded pipeline, the tested deep neural network classifier yields a much higher accuracy, thus mitigating the effect of the adversarial perturbation.
I. INTRODUCTION
State of the art machine learning algorithms have revolutionized automated classification technologies in various fields like computer vision, natural language processing, and biometric information security [1] [2] [3] . High classification accuracy in the foregoing applications has led to the deployment of learning algorithms in a multitude of environments. Yet, recent studies have exposed the vulnerabilities of accurate machine learning classification in the presence of adversarial attacks [4] . More specifically, the injection of visually imperceptible l 2 and l ∞ bounded perturbations into the input testing data has shown to render even the most robust classifiers useless. This paper presents novel defense strategies, which are not only capable of combatting such adversarial attacks, but are also more robust than current standards in the literature.
We consider an attacker-defender scenario, where the attacker employs an urtargeted misclassification attack to induce a trained multi-layer fully-connected artificial neural network to misclassify the input sample. We consider three defense strategies: a stand-alone Denoising Autoencoder (DAE), a reduced-dimension representation of the input obtained from a fully-connected autoencoder neural network, and finally a cascade of the aforementioned defenses connected in series. Each defense strategy is tested in both a semi-white box and a black-box environment. In either scenario, the attacker is blind to the pre-processing defense algorithms.
A. Related Work
Machine learning attacks, such as the DeepFool algorithm [7] , the Carlini and Wagner l 2 attack [8] , and the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) algorithm [9] , rely on perturbing the input sample by optimizing different network parameters. Previous studies have investigated the effectiveness of using sparsity as a defense against such adversarial perturbations. For example, Z. Marzi et al. [5] show that enforcing sparsity by taking the K out of N largest elements in magnitude, and zeroing the rest, for an input classifier sample in the wavelet domain, successfully decreases the misclassification caused by an adversarial attack on a Support Vector Machine (SVM). Furthermore, A. N. Bhagoji et al. [6] show that using Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is effective in decreasing adversarial success as well. Further, A. N. Bhagoji et al. [6] extend their defense strategies beyond SVMs and successfully demonstrate PCA as a successful defense in multi-class scenarios on artificial neural networks. Furthermore, S. Gu et al. [11] showed that DAEs can be used to effectively remove Gaussian noise injected into input samples, but it does not explore their application in the scenario of an adversarial attack. However, S. Gu et al. [11] does reveal that multi-layer denoising autoencoder architectures can be used to effectively eliminate injected noise. We aim to extend the use of DAEs in different scenarios so that they can be used as a defense against perturbed inputs. Specifically, we train a DAE architecture capable of outputting clean samples regardless of whether the inputted data was benign or corrupted.
B. Contributions
We present three novel defense strategies to combat adversarial machine learning attacks: The Denoising Autoencoder (DAE), dimensionality reduction using the learned hidden layer of a fully-connected autoencoder neural network, and a cascade of the DAE followed by the learned reduced dimensional subspace in series. Each of our defense strategies are 978-1-7281-1151-3/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE used as pre-processing defense mechanisms which aim to reduce the effect of the adversary on a trained fully-connected multi-layer artificial neural network. Our experiments reveal the effectiveness of using all three defenses to combat adversarial attacks. In particular, we show that the outputs of the DAE and our novel cascaded architecture significantly increase the accuracy of a classifier on a corrupted testing set in comparison to not using any defense. To the best of our knowledge, the gains in accuracy achieved in this study have not been achieved by any other defense strategy against adversarial attacks for neural network classifiers.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

A. Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks
Neural networks are vulnerable to different types of adversarial attacks. Attacks which corrupt training data are called poisoning attacks [12] , which result in incorrectly trained classifiers. Attacks which corrupt test data are called evasion attacks. Out of several methods to optimally perturb neural network inputs, this paper explores two gradient-based evasion attack methods: the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) attack and the Fast Gradient (FG) attack. The FGS attack [13] adds an l ∞ -bounded perturbation η such that η = ||x − x|| ∞ , where x and x correspond to the original and corrupted sample, respectively. This results in the following corruption:
where x(η) is the perturbed version of the input data sample x, whose predicted class is y, and J(θ, x, y) represents the cost function used to train the neural network, where θ represents the network weights. The sign of the gradient of this cost function is scaled by η and added to the benign data sample to perturb it. A moderately low choice of η, below an approximate threshold of 0.15, results in visually imperceptible perturbations. We consider η ∈ [0.00, 0.50]. A variation of the FGS attack is the Fast Gradient (FG) attack, which introduces an l 2 bounded error such that = ||x − x|| 2 . This results in the following corrupted sample:
For l 2 -bounded perturbations, the perturbations are imperceptible for larger bounds as well. We consider ∈ [0.0,3.5].
There are different categories of attacks, based on how much knowledge the adversary has about the trained model and the defense mechanism. A white box scenario is when the adversary has access to the trained model and the defense strategy. It is highly unlikely for an adversary to have so much information about the classifier, which is why we omit this scenario in our experiments. A slightly more realistic scenario is the semi-white box setting, in which the adversary has access to the training dataset and classifier architecture, but is blind to the defense mechanism. An even more practical setting is the black-box setting, where the attacker has access to the training data only, and arbitrarily (or using imperfect knowledge) selects a classifier architecture, based on which it generates its adversarial examples. The black box scenario represents the most realistic attacker-defender situation and illustrates the application of our adversarial defense algorithms in defender-attacker mismatched classifier scenarios.
B. Experimental Setup
We evaluate the effect of our defenses on a classifier trained on the MNIST data set [14] , which consists of 60,00 training examples and 10,000 testing examples of 28 x 28 pixel, handwritten digits. Each image represents a digit from 0 to 9, and each pixel value is normalized to lie in [0, 1]. We consider a fully connected neural network classifier with an input layer consisting of 784 units followed by two layers of 100 units each. The output layer contains 10 neurons, which correspond to one of ten possible digit classes. Throughout this paper, this fully connected model is referred to as the FC-100-100-10 architecture. In the black box scenario, the adversary generates perturbations based on an FC-200-200-100-10 architecture, whose name corresponds to the same naming convention as that of the FC-100-100-10 model. Each layer has ReLu activation functions, except the last layer, which has a softmax activation function. The batch size used for training is 200, the optimizer is adam, the loss function is categorical crossentropy, and 100 epochs are used to train both the classifier and the autoencoders. It is important to note that distinct FC-100-100-10 architectures were trained for each of the four attack environments, which results in slightly different baseline accuracy values due to unique parameter initilizations in each scenario. All neural networks were implemented using the Keras library [10] in Python, and the adversarial perturbations were generated using the Cleverhans library [9] .
C. Defense Strategies 1) Denoising using Autoencoders: Propagating the data through an autoencoder forces the network to learn the underlying manifold of the input by mapping noisy data back onto the clean manifold distribution of the data. Therefore, the output of the Denoising Autoencoder (DAE) is an uncorrupted version of the input sample. However, to generate such a model, the training dataset must consist of both clean and corrupted samples and their corresponding clean outputs. For both considered semi-white box and black box attack environments, the defender simulates adversarial training data, using the FGS attack, by adding perturbations, with a magnitude of η = 0.25, to the training samples based on the gradient of the FC-100-100-10 model. The DAE is then trained with both clean and perturbed data. The architecture of the denoising autoencoder was chosen to be a fully connected neural network with the following architecture: 784-256-128-64-128-256-784. The DAE is then trained with 60,000 clean data samples, and 60,000 corrupted data samples, and optimized using the mean squared error cost function over 150 epochs using a batch size of 256. The DAE's mean squared error reaches a minimum at 0.0049, indicating the network's robust ability to approximate the uncorrupted input of both clean and perturbed samples. Our experiments revealed that the DAE trained to combat l ∞ attacks delivers a more robust defense, compared to using a DAE trained to combat l 2 attacks, even when combatting l 2 bounded attacks. Thus, all FG attacks were defended using the DAE trained to combat l ∞ attacks.
2) Dimensionality Reduction using Autoencoders: The output of the bottleneck layer of an autoencoder gives a compressed representation of the data. We experiment with different numbers of hidden layers to compress the initial 784 input dimensions to a smaller number of dimensions k.
The various values of k considered are 331, 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20, with different magnitudes of the perturbation bound to determine which compressed representation gives the best accuracy. Instead of using all 784 input features, we use a lesser number of features as the input data, both for training and for testing. This also means that the size of the input layer changes, which means that it is unnecessary to train it with the architecture that uses 784 input dimensions. For each value of k, the autoencoder architecture used was 784k-784. Each model was a fully connected neural network trained with the MNIST training set of 60,000 samples.
3) Cascaded Defense: We consider a novel defense strategy, in which we cascade the DAE with dimensionality reduction. First, we denoise the test data using the denoising autoencoder, after which we reduce its dimensionality using the hidden layer representation of an autoencoder, before sending it as an input into the classifier.
III. RESULTS
This section shows the efficacy of each defense in four environments: the semi-white box FGS attack, the semi-white box FG attack, the black box FGS attack, and the black box FG attack. Specifically, we show that the DAE alone is an effective defense capable of increasing the average accuracy across a noise range of [0.00, 0.50] from 13.76% to 95.55% in a semi-white box environment, and from 18.54% to 78.37% in a black-box environment under an l ∞ bounded attack. Furthermore, we show that dimensionality reduction using an autoencoder is also an effective defense against adversarial attacks, that is capable of increasing the average accuracy across a noise range of [0.00, 0.50] from 13.76% to 51.09% in a semi-white box environment, and from 18.54% to 48.62% in a black box environment under an l ∞ bounded attack. Finally, our cascaded architecture, consisting of the output of the DAE followed by dimensionality reduction using another autoencoder, increases the average accuracy across the same noise range from 13.76% to 96.27% in a semi-white box environment, and from 18.54% to 79.88% in a black box environment under an l ∞ bounded attack.
We also obtain similar results for attacks induced according to the l 2 norm. 1
A. Semi-White Box FGS Attack
The FC-100-100-10 classifier yields an initial classification test accuracy, after being trained on a disparate training set, of 98.00%, which confirms the robustness of the classifier to clean input data that. However, after injecting each input sample with an l ∞ bounded noise, with a magnitude perturbation of η = 0.25, the same classifier yields an accuracy of 2.55%. To combat such an attack, the corrupted data is propagated through the DAE, and its output is then input into the classifier. After using the DAE to defend an attack on the magnitude of η = 0.25, the classifier is able to achieve a 95.96% classification accuracy. Similarly, as shown in Figure 1 , we see that defending an attack using the DAE improves classification accuracy nearly 30-fold for all values of η ∈ [0.00, 0.50]. Specifically, we are able to achieve an average classification accuracy of 95.55% over all tested noise levels, which is quite significant compared to the average accuracy of 13.76%, achieved using no defense.
Using the hidden layer of an autoencoder to reduce the number of dimensions occupied by input samples results to an increase in accuracy against adversarial attacks. For example, injecting a perturbation of η = 0.25 into the testing data, and then using an autoencoder to extract the k = 40 most significant features of the corrupted input for classification by the FC-100-100-10 model, increases the accuracy from 2.55% to 46.29%. Furthermore, reducing the dimensionality to k = 40 results in an average classification accuracy of 51.09% across all tested noise levels, as compared to an average accuracy of 13.76% classification accuracy when the perturbed data is processed without any defense. Therefore, using a reduced dimension of k = 40 provides the best dimensionality reduction defense for the semi-white box FGS attack. The specific improvements in accuracy for all tested levels of noise are shown in Figure 1 below.
The series combination of the DAE followed by dimensionality reduction, using k = 80 reduced dimensions, provides the best defense compared to using either defense independently. The cascaded defense in which the the denoised data is reduced to 80 dimension yields an average classification accuracy of 96.27%, which is greater than both the 95.55% average classification accuracy, achieved by using only the DAE, and the 46.29% average classification accuracy, achieved by the most robust dimensionality reduction defense of k = 40. Figure 2 below shows the accuracy of each cascaded defense for all tested noise levels.
B. Semi-White Box FG Attack
The injection of adversarial noise bounded under the l 2 constraint into testing data, without deploying any defense, results in an average accuracy of 27.79% for ∈ [0, 3.5]. However, using the DAE trained to combat l ∞ bounded attacks as a defense, the FC-100-100-10 is able to achieve an average accuracy of 85.30% over the same noise range. Figure 3 below shows the specific accuracy attained for each noise level before and after introducing the corruption without employing a defense, as well as the classification accuracy of each tested noise level after using the DAE as a defense and then using the FC-100-100-10 classifier model. Deploying dimensionality reduction as a defense also proves to increase accuracy. Reducing the dataset to k = 80 dimensions results in the most robust dimensionality reduction classification by increasing the average accuracy from 27.79% to 76.83% across the entire tested noise range. However, using a reduced dimension of k = 40 and k = 60 results in an average classification accuracy of 76.03% and 76.48%, respectively. Using a lower dimension of k = 20 yields an average accuracy of 69.12%, indicating that relevant features of the data are lost at high levels of compression. Figure 3 below shows specific accuracies for each tested noise level for different numbers of reduced dimensions. The cascaded architecture, on average, does not outperform the stand-alone DAE defense for any of the experimented reduced dimensions. The cascaded defenses in which k = 40, k = 60, and k = 80 produce an average classification accuracy of 84.68%, 85.23%, and 85.10%, respectively, whereas using the DAE alone yields an average classification accuracy of 85.30%. As shown in Figure 4 below, the aforementioned reduced dimensions improve the accuracy when used in a cascade, as compared to only the reduced dimensions alone, but the cascaded defense is never able to achieve greater robustness than merely using the DAE as defense. Fig. 4 : Results for Semi-White Box FG Attack with a cascaded DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defense.
Semi-White Box FGS Attack (Individual Defense)
C. Black Box FGS Attack
The initial testing accuracy of the black box FC-100-100-10 model is 98.05%, which confirms the robustness of the classifier after it has been trained with similar, but disparate, training data. After the attacker has generated an independent model, corresponding to an FC-200-200-100-10 architecture, each input is attacked according to (1) , where J() corresponds to the cost function of the attackers model. The corrupted inputs are then passed into the defenders classifier model. The average accuracy, without a defense, is 18.54% over η ∈ [0.00, 0.50]. After deploying the stand-alone DAE defense, the defenders model achieves an increased average accuracy of 78.37% over the same noise range. Figure 5 shows the accuracy achieved for each tested noise level with and without the DAE defense.
The best dimensionality reduction defense, which is achieved using k = 60, results in an average accuracy of 48.62%, which is greater than the average accuracy of 18.54% obtained with no defense. Furthermore, using k = 80 produces an average accuracy of 48.20%. We observe that using K > 80 allows the reduced dimensional representation to retain more noise than necessary, reducing the average accuracy whereas k < 40 forces the representation to extort relevant features. This trend can be seen in Figure 5 , which shows the accuracy of different noise levels for each reduced dimensional representation of the data. The cascaded architecture defense using k = 60 improves the average accuracy from 18.54% to 79.88%. Furthermore, using k = 20 and k = 40 results in average accuracies of 79.59% and 79.33%, respectively. Each of these cascaded architectures outperforms the DAE as a stand-alone defense, which produces an average accuracy of 78.37% across the entire tested noise range. This phenomenon does not contradict earlier observations about compression reducing accuracy due to the extortion of relevant data features as this trend would still be prevalent for further compressions of the data (k < 20). Figure 6 below shows the accuracy of each tested noise level for the cascaded defense consisting of different compression levels. 
D. Black Box FG Attack
The FC-100-100-10 classifier in this scenario achieves an accuracy of 97.88% on the MNIST test data with neither attack nor defense. Introducing an attack based on a disparate FC-200-200-100-10 architecture reduces the average accuracy to 31.08% for ∈ [0, 3.5]. Deploying the DAE defense, which was trained to combat l ∞ bounded attacks generated from the FC-100-100-10 classifier, improves the average accuracy to 69.14%. Figure 7 below shows the attained accuracies at each tested noise level with and without the defense. The trend confirms that the DAE can effectively improve accuracy in a mismatched architecture setting.
Using dimensionality reduction as a stand-alone defense proves to effectively increase the average accuracy in this setting. The most robust defense is achieved using k = 40, which leads to an average accuracy of 60.48% over ∈ [0, 3.5]. Furthermore, using k = 60 results in an average accuracy of 59.83%, whereas using k = 20 results in an average accuracy of 56.35%. The loss of accuracy experienced by the increase or decrease in the number of dimensions further confirms the retention of excess noise or extortion of relevant features, respectively, for a reduced dimensional representation of the input. Figure 7 shows the accuracy at each tested noise level for different reduced dimensional subspaces as stand-alone defenses.
Similar to the semi-white box FG attack, the cascaded defense does not, on average, outperform the stand-alone DAE for any of the experimented reduced dimensions. The most robust cascaded defense is the architecture in which the DAE is followed by a reduced dimension of k = 80, results in an average accuracy of 68.78% across the tested noise range. Also, using a reduced dimension of k = 60 and k = 100 results in average accuracies of 68.22% and 68.56%, respectively, whereas the stand-alone DAE yields an average accuracy of 69.14% across the same noise range. Figure 8 shows the accuracy of the cascaded architectures and reveals that none of the cascaded defenses outperforms the stand-alone DAE at any tested noise level. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our experiments revealed novel defense mechanisms capable of combatting adversarial attacks on neural network classifiers. The DAE can deliver a significant gain in accuracy for corrupted data, as compared to using no defense, as well as retain high accuracy levels when processing benign inputs. Further, this paper showed that shallow autoencoder networks used to reduce the dimensionality of the input is another effective defense against adversarial attacks and independently delivers accuracies approximately equivalent to similar dimensionality reduction defense mechanisms such as PCA. Finally, our cascaded architecture, consisting of the DAE followed by dimensionality reduction for various values, proved to be more effective than either stand-alone defense when the attacker introduced the FGS attack, but it showed to be slightly less robust than using the DAE alone when inducing the FG attack.
